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Imagine a world of myriad human beings, mirroring their genetic creator in every moving 
finger, in every breathing action.  Imagine a type of post-Apocalyptic world where non-
human animals are cloned to beget even more cloned animals.  Wake up to the nightmare 
scenario of individuality assaulted by the creation of non-unique cloned artefacts of a science 
that has gone a bit askew.  These are some of the myths about cloning that are commonly 
held.  The primary purpose of Kerry Lyn Macintosh’s exciting and challenging book is to de-
bunk and de-mystify a number of fallacies about human cloning.  This is a truly wonderful 
book which is mesmerising in the way it achieves its simple purposes.  Macintosh sets out the 
science, the psychology, and the law relating to cloning and, in so doing, she addresses, with 
keen insight and unwavering clarity, the fallacies that have grown up in our commonly held 
perceptions and fears about human cloning. 
 
The very first, very visible, attribute of the book is the ease with which it can be read from a 
sheer physical point of view.  The font size is big, the margins are wide, the bold signposting 
is visually compelling.  This structure includes unambiguous setting out of the content to be 
covered at the outset of each chapter and clear, concise chapter summaries at the end.  All of 
this creates a book that is attractively presented.  It appeals to the lazy part in me, the part that 
cannot be bothered reading dense academic text.  The simplicity of the structure of the book 
does not, however, imply simplicity of content or lack of rigour in approach.  Scientific 
myths are debunked with precision and rich sources of evidence. 
 
Furthermore, Macintosh skilfully links science to psychological reasoning using a continuum 
of interesting fallacies: identity,1 artefact,2 imposter,3 and resurrection fallacies.4  The identity 
fallacy considers that a non-human animal born through cloning will have the same traits as 
the donor with the same nuclear DNA (p. 27).  The artefact fallacy is that ‘animals (or, 
potentially, humans) born through cloning are necessarily the flawed products of a 
technological process and can never be functional members of their species’ (p. 16).  The 
imposter fallacy includes ‘the concern that humans born through cloning will be 
doppelgangers capable of stealing our assets, jobs, loved ones, and individuality’ (p. 64). 
Finally, the resurrection fallacy comprises of ‘the notion that an animal or person born 
through cloning extends or adopts the life of her donor’ (p. 27).  These fallacies are presented 
as being connected to essentialism.  The relevant law pertaining to human cloning is 
presented clearly and succinctly.  Although she paints a picture primarily of a North 
American legal context, Macintosh draws non-American readers into that landscape because 
the picture painted is international in nature and will appeal to an international audience.  
This is a book that is of immediate relevance, as the day of the human being created from the 
DNA of three people has emerged and, in the UK at least, is the subject of imminent 
                                                          
1 ‘Identity and Essentialism’, Ch 4.  
2 ‘Artifacts and Essentialism’, Ch 5 
3 ‘Imposters and Essentialism’, Ch 6. 
4 ‘Resurrection and Essentialism’, Ch 7 
legislation.5  Indeed, new emerging practices in creating babies from different forms of DNA 
means that the world of some form of human cloning may be just around the corner. 
 
This book is divided into three parts, and in Part I Macintosh examines the science of 
cloning.6  In the first chapter she explores the different methods that have been used to clone 
non-human animals.7  Macintosh describes how non-human animals, including Dolly the 
sheep, who are born through cloning are individuals and not simply copies, explains why they 
are unique, and how they have their own lifespans.  In Chapter 2 she considers the 
individuality of non-human animals who have been born through cloning, and examines why 
they do not often look like or act in the same manner as the non-human animals involved in 
the DNA donation.8  Macintosh thus explores the identity fallacy and  explains that non-
human animals born through cloning do not possess the same physical, intellectual, 
psychological, or behavioural characteristics as the DNA donors, and have normal lifespans.  
This, according to Macintosh, dismisses the fallacy that cloned non-human animals carry on 
the lives of their DNA donors. 
  
In Chapter 3 Macintosh looks at the scientific possibility of cloning human embryos, and 
refers to biological principles as well as experiments based on non-human animals to predict 
the traits of humans born through cloning.9  She considers the following questions: ‘[c]ould 
cloning produce warm bodies ad infinitum to house the soul?  Could it resurrect dead loved 
ones - or, more menacingly, dictators and psychopaths?’ (p. 43).  She explains why humans 
born through cloning will not be resurrections of the dead but ordinary members of our 
species, notwithstanding the reality that no credible reports of cloned humans or cloned 
human pregnancies exist.  The results of experiments in non-human animal cloning are thus 
the best evidence of what we can expect for humans. 
  
Macintosh argues, in Part I, that the efficiency of non-human animal cloning is improving, 
and that the majority of non-human animals who survive birth and the first few weeks of life 
are healthy.  They are ‘functional members of their species’ (p. 61) and not ‘carbon copies’ of 
their DNA donors.  They are unique (p. 61).  Thus, if humans are cloned, they will be born as 
babies, will have their own lifespans (p. 62), and, as such, ‘the artefact, identity and 
resurrection fallacies will prove just as false for humans as animals’ (p. 62).  In Part I, 
Macintosh explores a world of scientific possibility, and opens the door to avenues of 
research into human cloning that are almost within our grasp and may only be limited by our 
imaginations.  The science is described in clear and unambiguous terms, and there are no 
convoluted arguments.  Rather, there is a symphony of well constructed and well written 
chapters that tease out stimulating and interesting scientific concepts and practices. 
 
In Part II, Macintosh turns to the perception of human cloning in popular culture and 
politics.10  Liberals and conservatives, according to Macintosh, both oppose cloning, and the 
notion that cloning human babies ‘must be stopped’ (p. 63) arises from safety concerns as 
well as from the existence of the four fallacies. Macintosh introduces the concept of 
psychological essentialism which, in its classic formulation, holds that ‘the brains of human 
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6 ‘The Science of Cloning’. 
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beings intuit that certain categories possess an intrinsic nature or essence’ (p. 64).  She 
discusses the relationship between the four fallacies and popular culture in relation to the 
concept of essentialism throughout Part II.  For example, Macintosh presents a 
comprehensive list of films where the identity fallacy can be seen, including Star Wars II: 
Attack of the Clones where ‘Jango Fett and the men generated from his DNA share an 
identical appearance, physical strength, and the ability to fight well.  These traits are 
preserved across hundreds of thousands of soldiers, with 1 million more to come’ (p. 81).11  
The identify fallacy can also be seen in media reports, influential books, such as Future 
Shock,12 and in government reports (p. 82).13  Cloned humans are thus commonly presented 
as multitudinous copies (p. 100), and while ‘[b]iological science predicts the individuality of 
humans born through cloning, no matter how many there are … psychological perception 
trumps biological reality’ (p. 100).  Macintosh  argues that government reports do not 
‘unmask the role of essentialism in the cloning debate, nor do they advocate the public 
education or counselling that could equip parents to raise healthy children in an informed and 
fair-minded society’ (p. 101).  This point elucidates the complexity of the issue of cloning 
and the need for public education to address ever-widening perspectives on this contentious 
issue. 
 
Chapter 5 concerns the artefact fallacy and the (incorrect) idea that cloning creates 
technological products instead of ordinary members of species (p. 103).14  Macintosh 
explores the essentialist view of artefacts and highlights the fact that human beings cannot be 
regarded as artefacts of this ilk.  Again, she looks at popular culture and uses the example of 
Star Wars II to exemplify how the artefact fallacy has been used within this culture to 
perpetuate hidden fears that exist within social consciousness. The exploration of this 
example makes for riveting reading. Macintosh effectively uses film and media as a tool to 
connect complex scientific facts to a communal understanding of science that has developed 
through our engagement with scientific concepts in the mythical and fraudulent landscape of 
science fiction.  We know Star Wars.  We connect to it.  We share common understandings 
about the non-human species shown on our screen.  Macintosh helps to build a bond between 
this understanding of science in a media-specific arena, the world of psychology, and the 
world of fallacy.  By engaging with film and media in this way, she bridges the gap between 
the science of the real world and the science of science fiction, and, somewhere in that gap, 
human cloning is there as a reality or as a fantasy or as a fallacy which we both fear and 
revere.  
 
The imposter fallacy is explored in Chapter 6.15  This fallacy occurs in two versions.  An 
extreme version is often seen in TV and film, and involves ‘a person born through cloning 
[who] is a dangerous doppelganger who impersonates the DNA donor in order to steal his 
assets, job, spouse or partner, and life’ (p. 125).16  The more subtle version is evident in 
media and government reports where it is implied that the individuality and uniqueness of the 
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National Bioethics Advisory Commission (1997): 
<https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/nbac/pubs/cloning1/cloning.pdf > accessed 24 April 2015.  
14 ‘Artifacts and essentialism’. 
15 ‘Imposters and essentialism’. 
16 This is apparent in, e.g., The Island (Dream Works/Warner Brothers, 2005) where it is suggested that the 
cloned impersonators have the capability to destroy their donors and take hold of their possessions, see 
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original DNA donor is under threat by the construction of the clone (p. 125).17  Macintosh 
says that, in theory, a human clone can be created from a single cell, and that ‘the imposter 
fallacy focuses on the supposed menace that cloning poses to you or me’ (p. 125). The 
existence of fear is a noteworthy factor motivating the antagonism towards human cloning.  
This part of the book strikes at the core of the hidden fears that many of us have.  These fears 
are unmasked, and the fraudulence and false view of cloning that lies behind them are 
revealed in the substance of these compelling arguments.  We are thus startled out of our 
blind acceptance of the fallacies that we have subliminally accepted. Macintosh’s examples 
and stories ‘benefit from essentialist intuitions that make it seem credible that a severed 
somatic cell could transmit historical path from donor to another person’ (p. 144). 
 
With regards to the resurrection fallacy and its relationship to essentialism, this fallacy is a 
popular theme in science fiction films (p. 147).18  Macintosh suggests that it may have its 
roots in psychological essentialism, and that ‘[i]f one believes that a unique essence 
permeates the body of a dead person, one may also believe that cloning transmits that essence 
to a new body via the donor cell’ (p. 163).  Her arguments here are persuasive and compel the 
reader to investigate further into both the science and psychology that form the discussion 
around human cloning.  
 
Overall, in Part II Macintosh explains why there is such widespread belief in the four 
fallacies.  She argues that the fallacies have their roots in psychological essentialism, and that 
‘it makes sense that essentialism yields multiple misconceptions that depend on context’ (p. 
168).  The chapters in this Part summarise and analyse four particular fallacies that are 
attributed to human cloning: identity, resurrection, imposter, and artefact.  Macintosh shines a 
light on our deepest fears and nightmare visions of what a brave new world of human cloning 
might bring about.  In so doing, she clarifies the most ridiculous of our assumptions, and 
demystifies the scientific realities of cloning.  
 
In the final Part of this book, Macintosh examines the legal consequences of essentialist 
intuitions about cloning.19  She looks separately at reproductive cloning (the cloning of 
babies), and research cloning (the creation of cloned embryos for stem cell research and 
possible therapy).  In Chapter 8 Macintosh analyses the political and legal responses to 
human reproductive cloning.20  She explores how the different fallacies have impacted on the 
public, legislators, and regulators, and argues that psychological essentialism is a hidden 
driver behind the response to human reproductive cloning.  This heuristic has led liberal 
lawmakers to betray their longstanding allegiance to reproductive freedom, and has lured 
liberals and conservatives into supporting laws that run counter to egalitarianism (p. 198).  In 
Chapter 9 Macintosh considers how conservatives take advantage of cloning fallacies to ban 
all forms of cloning, whereas liberals use the fallacies to ban reproductive but not research 
cloning.21  The concern is that, as Macintosh points out, ‘[t]hey don’t seem to realize … that 
their strategy also makes the slippery slope seem all the more dangerous.  In the end, 
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Congress may react by banning all human cloning, including cloning for stem cell research’ 
(p. 220). 
 
What is good about this book?  Macintosh sets out her objectives very clearly and, by the end 
of the book, it is evident that those have been achieved.  The language used within this book 
is, perhaps, its greatest strength.  Macintosh successfully takes difficult, scientific, 
psychological and legal concepts, and describes them in a way that is, to a large degree, free 
of jargon.  The reader will not get lost in labyrinthine and complex argument.  Indeed, at 
times the language is almost poetic; it grips the reader and takes us into this world of science, 
psychology, and law.  Ideas are presented that suit a multiple audience.  A student of law 
would find the legal argument interesting and relevant.  A reader of psychology would find 
the analysis of the essence of the human being and the interplay of a number of variables in 
the formation of that essence an argument of resonating sense.  A proponent of science would 
find the description and analysis of the scientific procedures involved in human cloning to be 
of significant interest.  And for the reader who has no particular commitment to these fields 
but is interested in the human condition and the potential of science to impact on that 
condition, this book should be a compelling read. 
 
Having said that, Part III of the book which deals with the law is the weakest Part.  
Unfortunately, Macintosh paints an incomplete legal landscape, and does not include 
sufficient analysis of the international law that impacts on human cloning and scientific 
innovation.  She also fails to fully address the consequences of the legal limits that can be 
applied to these forms of scientific endeavour.  The reality is, of course, that there is little 
legal discourse around this subject and the parameters of future legislation are unclear. In this 
context, the law is another country and the territorial boundaries of it have not yet been drawn 
or tested in the courts.  However, the failure of Macintosh to address the legal context as 
completely as she addresses scientific and psychological contexts, is not a failure but 
represents the fact that human cloning could happen within a legal context that is yet to be 
fully tested. 
 
It is worth reading this book for a number of reasons. Macintosh considers an interesting and 
future-focused topic, and applies a new psychological perspective to a scientific process.  The 
marriage of science and psychology in the book is comfortable.  The debunking of the myths 
that surround the named fallacies get us to think beyond what is portrayed as fact.  We are 
empowered to seek out the truth that lies behind what is publicly portrayed as scientific fact.  
If you are interested in the world of scientific possibility and in unpacking that scientific 
possibility from the point of view of human psychology and legal reasoning, then this book is 
for you.  If you are interested in what happened to Dolly and what might happen to all the 
Dollys that might be created, then this book will also appeal to you.  This is not a book to sit 
on a coffee table, collecting dust, and forming the basis of polite conversation.  It is a book to 
be devoured. 
